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Abstract
This paper studies the effects of anticipations of tax changes in the USA through the release 
of tax news in the media. I construct a new measure that captures the anticipation of tax bill 
approvals by exploiting the content of news in the US television. Since this information typically 
fl ows faster than standard measures of GDP, I propose a mixed frequency dynamic factor 
model to estimate both the economic activity latent factor and the effects of anticipated tax 
shocks on it. I fi nd that onemonth-ahead media anticipations of tax approvals signifi cantly 
stimulate current economic activity. This stimulation comes from anticipations of tax cuts.
Keywords: fi scal policy, taxation, mass media, information, beliefs, random forests.
JEL classifi cation: E62, H20, N12, D80.
Resumen
Este artículo estudia los efectos que anticipaciones de cambios impositivos a través de 
noticias en los medios pudieron tener en la actividad económica de Estados Unidos. 
Para ello construyo una nueva medida que contiene el nivel de anticipación de la posible 
aprobación de proyectos de ley fi scal en el Congreso americano explotando el contenido de 
las noticias que se publicaron en la televisión norteamericana. Dado que esta información 
fl uye más rápido que las medidas estándar de PIB, propongo un modelo dinámico de 
frecuencias mixtas para estimar tanto el factor inobservable de actividad económica como 
los efectos de los potencialmente previsibles cambios fi scales sobre él. Encuentro que 
anticipaciones de cambios en la presión fi scal a un mes vista con la información de los 
medios estimulan signifi cativamente la actividad económica, siendo las anticipaciones de 
reducciones en la presión fi scal las que determinan el signo de este resultado.  
Palabras clave: política fi scal, impuestos, medios de comunicación, información, creencias, 
bosques aleatorios.
Códigos JEL: E62, H20, N12, D80.
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1 Introduction
Prior to the approval of laws, there is often widespread information about the progress
of bills. This information may be valuable for the forecasts that agents make about the
economic environment in the future. In the context of fiscal policy, agents may be very
attentive to information on these bills if by doing so they are able to anticipate changes
that will affect them. This paper provides a way to account for the economic responses
to anticipation of tax shocks when there is still uncertainty about the approval of tax
bills.
Mass media are a central player in the transmission of public information to society.
As reporters and analysts of fiscal bills during their process of elaboration and until
approval, they provide information that may be worth to the public’s forecast of the
success of potential new fiscal policy. This is an anticipation channel that has not
been considered before in the literature but one that as this paper shows is relevant to
economic activity.
In this paper I introduce a new measure of mass media anticipations of tax bill ap-
provals by exploiting the content of news in the US television during the period 1968-
2007. My measure of mass media anticipations is formulated as the predicted proba-
bility of a tax bill approval at future periods conditional on the available information in
mass media news at the current period. To address this quantification challenge I use
a machine learning algorithm from the family of Classification and Regression Trees
(CART). CART methods allow the researcher to consider large number of variables for
a classification task, whereas standard discrete choice models such as Probit or Logit
cannot handle this problem. They are highly non-linear models which help learning the
features that better fit the data in a very flexible way. Nonetheless, they suffer from
overfitting when the data is very noisy and of bias when there is a high correlation
among the features. The news data suffers from all these issues. To overcome them
I make use of automatic text analysis techniques to reduce the noise in the data and
several extensions of Random Forests to reduce the problem of correlated features.
Time aggregation in the analysis of quarterly economic indicators may mask im-
portant anticipation effects, since information through the news may evolve quickly in
a matter of days. To circumvent this issue I propose a dynamic factor model to esti-
mate both the economic activity latent factor and the effects of anticipated tax shocks
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on it. The empirical basis for this type of study relies on the joint analysis of text data
and high frequency indicators of economic activity. In principle, one may want to con-
sider different frequencies, therefore a mixed frequency analysis is appropriate. To my
knowledge this is the first paper that exploits a dynamic factor model to account for fis-
cal policy effects on economic activity. The factor specification considers the dynamics
of the factor and the potential effects of tax changes and their anticipation on it. To
identify the effects of anticipations on economic activity I take advantage of the vari-
ation of estimated beliefs on future tax changes over time. The variation responds to
anticipations of approved tax bills but also to ex-post-erroneous anticipations given the
information in the media.
In my empirical analysis, I have control of the potential effects of tax changes from
the bill initial status to the implementation. This strategy allows measuring implementa-
tion effects of tax changes net of other anticipation mechanisms that could be affecting
previous levels of economic activity.
My results reveal that one-month-ahead anticipations of tax approvals significantly
stimulate current economic activity growth. A ten percent increment in the measure of
one-month ahead tax anticipations reduces the monthly growth rate by 1.5%. Two and
three month ahead anticipations revert sign but do not have a statistically significant
effect on economic activity. After controlling for mass media anticipation, direct imple-
mentation effects of tax changes are reduced in absolute value but still have short-run
negative significant effects. The results also suggest an upward bias in the previous es-
timates of the fiscal multiplier proposed by Romer & Romer (2010) due to the omission
of anticipation effects. My results are robust to the inclusion of controls for implementa-
tion delays, following the strategy of Mertens & Ravn (2012). I also analyze the effects
of the anticipation of tax increases versus tax cuts finding that it is the anticipation of
tax cuts what stimulates the economy. Anticipating tax increases reduces economic
activity by 1,36% while anticipating tax cuts stimulates it by 3,04%.
From Random Forests I learn which text features best predict future tax approvals;
I find that those related to the later stages of the bill process are the most relevant
covariates for the one-month ahead predictions of tax approvals. The out-of-sample
predictive performance of the algorithm reveals we could have predicted four out of
twenty tax bill approvals at US Congress by using the television news about taxes.
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Relation to the Literature. This paper contributes to the extensive literature of the
effects of fiscal policy on economic activity. In particular, it contributes to the narrative
approach and the results from the seminal work of Romer & Romer (2010) by providing
an empirical strategy, a methodology and evidence of the effects of fiscal policy on
economic activity from initial information spills of a tax change to its implementation.
Mertens & Ravn (2012) study the effects of tax implementation delays by exploiting
the variation in the implementation horizon of the exogenous tax changes in Romer
& Romer (2010). They document that tax increases stimulate economic activity prior
to implementation while contractions in economic activity come earlier than if imple-
mentation was at the time of approval. In this paper, I also control for implementation
delays and still find evidence of anticipation effects. Also Coglianese et al. (2017) pro-
vide evidence of anticipation effects of gasoline tax changes in gasoline demand in a
framework of policy certainty.
While there is evidence of anticipation effects under certainty of the policy imple-
mentation, little is known in terms of behavior under uncertainty. This paper contributes
to this literature by considering anticipations of tax changes before bill approvals at
Congress, when the media can publish news related to the bill legal process, its eco-
nomic and political debate. I also distinguish between delayed and on-time implemen-
tation of tax changes and find that after considering mass media anticipations of tax
approvals, on-time tax changes have no significant effect after implementation in eco-
nomic activity while delayed tax changes have effects before and after implementation.
This paper contributes to the literature that studies the macroeconomic effects of
news content regarding policy announcements by providing a new way of synthesizing
many text features of news data into an indicator, in this case of anticipations, and
providing a way to estimate its macroeconomic effects. In this literature different works
have exploited the number of news mentioning a particular words or dealing with a
particular issue to study the macroeconomic effects of news about particular events.
Some of these works are Gregori et al. (2016), Bouzgarrou & Chebbi (2015), Caporale
et al. (2018), Beetsma et al. (2013) and Gade et al. (2013).
To my knowledge, this is the first application in the literature combining machine
learning and forecasting models to study the effects of massive policy-related informa-
tion from the media on economic activity. Classification algorithms such as Support
Vector Machines, Neural Networks or Naı¨ve Bayes have been mostly used for predic-
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tion in the field of finance. Manela & Moreira (2017) uses SVM to produce a measures
of stock volatility exploiting the information in disaster news. Min & Lee (2005) use
it to predict bankruptcy. Arvanitis & Bassiliades (2017) measures investor sentiment
using newspaper data and a Naı¨ve Bayes algorithm. Random Forest Classification is
a supervised learning algorithm that has been mainly used in fields other than eco-
nomics such as bioinformatics (Dı´az-Uriarte & De Andres, 2006; Yang et al., 2014,
June; Khalilia et al., 2011; Saeys et al., 2007; Chen & Liu, 2005) or ecology (Cutler
et al., 2007). An application that is closer to economics is the credit scoring study of
Van Sang et al. (2016). Recently, there are some economics applications that have
exploited Random Forests such as Bajari et al. (2015), Wager & Athey (2017) or Cher-
nozhukov et al. (2018).
This paper also relates to the literature that studies the effects of uncertainty on
economic activity. Baker et al. (2016) study the effects of a broad measure of policy
uncertainty on economic activity. They offer a specific measure of tax uncertainty con-
structed with newspapers mentions of economic policy uncertainty keywords. While
their aggregate EU index effectively relates to relevant episodes of economic uncer-
tainty, their EPU tax index is not specifically related to the process of tax legislation.
It actually contains other sources of uncertainty related to tax policy that are not di-
rectly related to the likelihood of tax bills approvals. My measure of tax beliefs differs
in that it is meant to capture the likelihood of a tax liability change at a specific date
conditional on the current information available, measuring the degree of certainty on a
specific policy change. The goal in my empirical strategy is to precisely track the level
of predictive information for each potential episode, leaving aside other confounders.
This paper is also related to the literature that studies the effects of media choices
on socio economic outcomes. Berg & Zia (2013) and Bursztyn & Cantoni (2016) pro-
vide evidence on microeconomic level effects of television content in private consump-
tion and savings and found significant effects. The effects of media news on economic
agents have been extensively documented in the field of finance. For example, the
works of Tetlock (2007), Tetlock et al. (2008) and Tetlock (2011) have shown how me-
dia sentiment and content affects investors or stock market performance.
Methodologically my paper relates to the time series literature that studies the ef-
fects of exogenous shocks on macroeconomic indicators. I propose the application
of forecasting and nowcasting models to the empirical analysis of policy shocks and
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macroeconomic news on economic activity. Using these models one can measure the
effects of information shocks that naturally happen at monthly, weekly or daily basis on
a latent factor of economic activity, helping us to track closely the effects of economic
policy. In earlier work, the study of the effects of tax changes on economic activity
has been implemented directly using GDP quarterly data. Mixing frequencies not only
gives us the possibility of learning about latent economic activity at other frequencies
but also to interpret economic activity in terms of GDP. For this reason, I use Mariano
& Murasawa (2003) to estimate the effects of taxes and their anticipation in economic
activity.
To some extent this paper also relates to the literature that studies the effects of tax
salience on taxpayer behavior. Previous literature has found that consumers undere-
act to taxes that are relatively less salient. Fore example, Chetty et al. (2009) shows
that when alcohol tax increases are included in posted prices, alcohol consumption
drops more than when the same tax increase is applied at the register. Li et al. (2014)
document a similar behavior for gasoline taxes. Baker et al. (2017) provide evidence
of tax salience in local newspapers for VAT changes but also on the importance of
fine-grained time series data to uncover economic activity effects of tax changes. Fi-
nally, the salience of taxes may not only affect the reaction of consumers but also of
politicians who may see an opportunity to extend particular taxes which are less salient
(Finkelstein, 2009; Cabral & Hoxby, 2012; Goldin & Homonoff, 2013).
Section 2 reviews the literature about fiscal policy effects on economic activity. In
Section 3, I explain the institutional framework for empirical study of tax legislation in
the US. In Section 4, I explain the data I use. Section 5 presents the empirical approach
and the measure of beliefs about tax legislation success using mass media news. In
Section 6, I discuss the empirical specification that I use to estimate the effects of taxes
on economic activity. Section 7 contains the results and Section 8 concludes.
2 Literature Review
The identification of the causal effects of fiscal policy on economic output is compli-
cated by the fact that the observed variation in fiscal policy is partly driven by the
economic cycle. There are two strands in the literature on the measurement of fis-
cal multipliers, the structural VAR approach and the Narrative approach. Under the
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structural VAR approach researchers have exploited plausible relations between eco-
nomic activity indicators and government revenues and spending with the purpose of
removing automatic and discretionary components of fiscal changes.
A variety of structural-VAR strategies have been exploited to accomplish this goal.
Blanchard & Perotti (2002) stresses the fact that within quarter discretionary responses
to output are unlikely and proceed to clean tax and government revenues from auto-
matic responses to output using quarterly data. They make further assumptions on
the structure of these relations and find that both increases in taxes and government
spending have a negative effect on output. Mountford & Uhlig (2009) contributes with
an extension of a sign restriction strategy to identify fiscal shocks. Using the same data
as Blanchard & Perotti (2002), they also exploit structural relations between economic
and fiscal indicators; government revenues increasing with output a key identifying as-
sumption they use, that is, when both series co-move it must be the case that there
has been an improvement in the business cycle. In addition to these sign restrictions,
impulse responses of the fiscal variables are assumed to be orthogonal to busyness
cycle shocks identified from the co-movements among a list of indicators. They find
that negative tax cuts work the best out of possible linear combinations of tax cuts
and spending. These authors also consider the identification of anticipation effects
of tax and government changes to output by assuming that one year ahead to the
implementation of a tax or government change there may be an effect at the time of
announcement which is related to the magnitude of the ex-post shock.
The narrative approach identifies tax and government spending shocks from texts
containing information about the political and legislative process of the tax change,
which can describe the motivation, size and timing of fiscal shocks. The seminal work
in this area is Romer & Romer (2010). They identify a list of tax episodes that can be
classified as either endogenous or exogenous to the economic cycle. The classification
relies on the narrative analysis of several documents from the legislative and executive
power while the bill was under elaboration. A tax change is classified as exogenous if
it is known not to offset factors pushing away growth from normal. More specifically,
tax changes aimed at improving growth in the long run or those made to deal with in-
herited budget deficits are considered exogenous. To measure the timing and revenue
effects Romer & Romer (2010) rely on documents from the Treasury and the Budget
of the Government. Sometimes the conference report on the bill is also a good source
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for revenue estimates. Ramey (2011) studies the output effects of government spend-
ing but she focuses instead on the three large war episodes and the expected public
spending related to those episodes as reported in Business Week.
None of these approaches are exempt from criticism. A disadvantage of the narra-
tive approach is the fact that estimates of the magnitude of fiscal shocks obtained from
gubernatorial documents may be measured with error if the contemporaneous forecast
of the fiscal multiplier by the government in charge is itself biased. This is less of a con-
cern for the structural VAR approach as long as one exploits budgetary fiscal revenue
data. The best feature of narrative approach is offering a reduction of the ommited
variable problem through controlling for many characteristics of fiscal episodes that are
contained in publicly available texts. This is a dimension of the empirical study of these
effects to which this paper also wants to contribute.
3 Institutional Framework
US federal laws are not passed until they have been discussed, elaborated and ap-
proved in different houses of Congress. For the specific case of tax laws, they gener-
ally originate as recommendations from the President, which may be announced at the
State of the Union Address. However, other House representative may also propose
them. If the President proposes a tax change, the Treasury Department will draft it.
Usually, this will happen during the first months of the year because the President will
only propose one tax bill per year and if not approved within the year it will die, so the
process will have to start from scratch. If the proposal comes from another agent, a
representative of the House Ways and Means prepares the law proposal or “bill”. All
tax legislation in the US must originate in the House of Representatives. When the
House of Ways and Means receives the proposal it arranges hearings so that people
can testify on the proposal. These people are the Secretary of the Treasury, Admin-
istrative officials and other groups of interest. The Committee in charge of the bill will
meet in executive session after the hearings. In this session they markup the proposal
and discuss it openly in public. They write the proposal in legislative language while
simultaneously elaborating a plain language report on the motivation that originate the
tax bill.
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Once the bill and the report are have been completed, the bill is introduced in the
House of Representatives for approval. When the tax bill is passed by the House, the
Senate Committee will start a similar process to the one of the House of Represen-
tatives, but using the bill and report written by the House of Representatives as the
starting point. The Senate Finance Committee usually makes amendments that are
written into a new report. The amended bill is debated by the entire Senate, which will
decide if it is passed in this house. If there are no amendments and the bill is passed,
it is sent to the President to be signed and it becomes law. If on the contrary, there the
bill has been amended, the modified bill is returned to the House of Representatives,
which will accept it or otherwise appoint a Conference Committee to rewrite the differ-
ences with the Senate. The new compromised version is voted by the two houses of
Congress, if passed it is sent to the White House for the signature by the President. If
the President vetoes the bill, the House and the Senate may try to override the veto by
securing more than two thirds of the favorable votes.
Once new taxes are legislated it may take months to their implementation; that is,
to the moment when citizens have the obligation to comply with the new tax legislation.
However, there are some special cases where tax legislation can be retroactive, which
implies an obligation to satisfy tax changes related to economic activity prior to the law
approval. A simplified version of the timing structure of the evolution of a tax bill into
tax law is depicted in Figure 1.
Notes: This diagram outlines the institutional stages of a tax bill in the US from its origination in a
proposal stage to its implementation. t states for a particular moment in time. A is the announcement
time, which generally is made at the State of the Union Address. H is the moment when the House
of Representatives passes the bill in the form of a report. S is the moment the report is passed by the
Senate. B is the time when the bill achieves a compromised version and is approved by the House
of Representatives and the Senate. 0 is the moment when the bill is approved by the president and it
becomes a law. M is the moment of implementation of tax changes, which can be divided in multiple
periods.
Figure 1: Evolution of US Tax Bills
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Throughout this process, there are many opportunities for the general public to
access information about the state of the bill and its prospective success. In specific
cases, journalists can listen to the live discussion. After each stage, there is also a pub-
lic release concerning the step that has been passed. The media is the most common
channel of information about the state of tax legislation for most people. Some groups
of interest may obtain first hand information by attending the hearings or through con-
sultation of official documents. The media may not cover all the legislative process in
the same manner neither all the tax episodes. The mass media may tend to select
some episodes and stages thereby influencing the type of information that spills to the
general public. We expect the mass media to cover episodes that affect a large share
of the population, but also episodes which are of more interest to their target audience.
In the latter regard, if there is a diversity of mass media we can presume that episodes
of relevance to all the sociodemographic spectrum will be covered by some media.
4.1 Romer & Romer (2010) Exogenous Tax Changes
I use Romer & Romer (2010) (RR) dataset on US tax liability changes which com-
prises information on the implementation date, magnitude and ”exogeneity” of each
US tax change taking place within the period 1948 to 2007. By reading Congressional
Reports and other gubernatorial documents, RR identify the motivation, timing and
magnitude of each approved tax change happening in the US during this period. Us-
ing this information they manually classify tax changes into more or less related to the
contemporaneous economic activity cycle. An exogenous tax liability change is one
that is classified as unrelated to the economic cycle.
In Table 1, I present descriptive statistics for the time series of all the RR exogenous
tax liability changes. There were in total fourty-two exogenous tax liability changes
4 Data
To estimate the effects of anticipation of tax episodes on economic activity I combine
various datasets. I use Romer & Romer (2010) exogenous tax liability changes to
identify exogenous tax episodes in the US between 1945 and 2007. To construct the
new measure of anticipations through mass media releases of information I use data
from US television from the Vanderbilt Television News Archive. Finally, to estimate the
mixed frequency dynamic factor model I use economic activity data.
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across the period 1968-2007. The average tax liability change was -0.06 per cent of
quarterly nominal GDP (QGDP) in the sample period. The standard deviation of tax
liability changes is 0.53. I also manually collect data from Romer & Romer (2009)
on the approval dates at US Congress of each tax episode in the US. In Table 1,
I also provide descriptive statistics for delayed tax liability changes, those that were
implemented at least one month after the approval date, on-time tax liability changes
and those implemented the same month of approval. On-time tax liability changes
where on average -0.03 of QGDP with a standard deviation of 0.47, while delayed
tax changes where on average -0.07 of QGDP with a standard deviation of 0.55. In
Appendix Table 7, I present the same statistic for the period 1945-2007.
Table 1: Romer & Romer (2010) Exogenous Tax Liability Changes
Variable Delayed Mean SD MIN 25th-p Median 75th-p MAX Obs
Tax change No -0.03 0.47 -1.11 -0.27 0.16 0.29 0.49 10
Horizon No 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
Tax change Yes -0.07 0.55 -1.65 -0.15 0.07 0.26 0.76 32
Horizon Yes 21.44 20.54 1.00 5.00 15.50 30.50 80.00 32
Tax change All -0.06 0.53 -1.65 -0.25 0.08 0.29 0.76 42
Horizon All 16.33 20.11 0.00 1.00 8.00 24.00 80.00 42
Notes: Tax change is the estimated magnitude of the exogenous tax liability changes measured in dollars
by Romer & Romer (2010) divided by the QGDP and expressed in percentage points. Horizon is the num-
ber of months between implementation of the tax change and approval of the tax episode. The summary
statistics correspond to time series 1968 to 2007.
In Figure 5, I present the time series of all exogenous tax liability changes through-
out the period 1968 to 2007. Since an episode may contain more than one tax liability
change and they are approved in the same date under the same bill, in Table 2 I provide
summary statistics for the magnitude of tax episodes in the US. An average episode
is -0.15 of QGDP, with 1.14 standard deviation of QGDP. I also offer the time series
of episodes by approval date in Figure 6. In Table 8, I provide the month-of-the-year
distribution of tax episodes approval and the implementation of tax liability changes,
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showing tax approvals are spread happened in almost all months but are concentrated
in the months of June to August and January. Tax changes are implemented mostly on
January and October with a less presence in the rest of the months.
4.2 Television Data
According to www.classictvhits.com, in 1960, out of 180 million US population, 47 mil-
lion households had a TV set. In 1998, out of 276 million US population, 99 million
households had a TV set. The first most viewed show in 1960 (Gunsmoke) had an esti-
mated audience of 17.5 million households. Interestingly, the total estimated audience
for the top 10 most rated shows in 1960 was 138 million households, approximately
Table 2: Romer & Romer (2010) Exogenous Episodes
Mean Std. Min. 25th-p Median 75th-p MAX Obs
1945-2007 -0.19 0.96 -4.34 -0.37 -0.04 0.32 1.09 36
1968-2007 -0.15 1.14 -4.34 -0.51 0.05 0.57 1.09 20
Notes: This table describes the size of Romer & Romer (2010) exogenous tax episodes which are
defined as the aggregate value of tax liability changes approved under the same tax bill as a share of
month of approval GDP.
the same as in 1998. Television reaches a large share of the US population since the
mid twentieth century. Finding out whether information funnelled through this channel
regarding future tax changes had any impact on economic activity before they even
become approved is a question of interest.
I use the Vanderbilt Television News Archive (VTNA) which has collected all evening
news shows aired at CBS, NBC, ABC from 1968 to the present and CNN from the
1995 to the present. The evening news shows last for 30 minutes and are broadcast at
6.30pm in the Eastern Zone1. I collected data on a brief title description, an abstract of
text describing the news, the number of seconds it occupied in the screen and its order
of appearance for each broadcast piece of news. I collect these data from their website
for shows aired from August 1968 (first available data point) to December 2007 (last
observation in Romer & Romer (2010) data). These news programs are an interesting
1Simultaneously broadcast in Central and Eastern Zones and three-hours tape-delayed broadcast in
the Pacific Zone. While CNN has single feed that airs in all time zones.
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piece of data to study since they are narrowed to 30 minutes everyday, aired to the
whole of the US simultaneously and informative of events which are interesting for
large section of the US population. Another good aspect of this data is providing data
for at least three major television channels through the sample period.
I define the universe of television news relevant to the study of anticipations of tax
changes by selecting those pieces of news that contain the stem ’tax’ and the surname
of any congressman in charge of an exogenous Romer & Romer (2010) episode. I
use the Congressional Bills Project: 1947-2007 (Adler & Wilkerson (2007)) to find the
names of the congressmen in charge of the exogenous bills passed at US Congress.
Filtering for ’tax’ mentions limits and guarantees that the information set contains those
news dealing with taxes. The alternative strategy would be to use all the available news
published in these media where tax news would be a small fraction that would hardly
survive to text processing algorithms. Using the congressmen surnames filter I can
produce a measure of tax anticipations restricted to the exogenous tax episodes. This
strategy helps to the identification of the effects of tax changes and their anticipations
on economic activity.
There are on average 5.36 pieces of news per month in the series of tax news. The
standard deviation is of 6.48 pieces. The months with tax news had a minimum of 1
and a maximum of 44 pieces. The average piece of tax news has 137.7 words and
754.6 characters. The standard deviation among the pieces of tax news is 80.8 words
and 440.6 characters.
In Table 3, I present summary statistics of the salience of tax news in the media
measured by total seconds per month. The median space that these news occupy in
the TV is 510 seconds per month, but the variation of minutes across months is large.
In Figure 7, I depict the monthly time series of seconds, which highlights that there will
be differences of coverage across different tax episodes.
Table 3: VTDA Tax Salience
Mean Std. Min. 25th-p Median 75th-p MAX Obs
Tax Salience 970.42 1353.30 10 240 510 1100 12630 337
Notes: Tax salience is measured as the month total of seconds that tax news were broadcast dur-
ing the period 1968 to 2008. Tax news are defined as those news that mentioned a congressmen in
charge of any Romer & Romer (2010) exogenous tax bill and the stem ’tax’.
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4.3 Economic Activity Data
I use the same economic activity indicators as the ones used in Mariano & Murasawa
(2003), namely quarterly real GDP (QGDP) and four monthly coincident indicators,
which are detailed in Table 9. I take the first difference of the natural log of each series,
multiplied by 100, and construct the growth rates. Table 4 shows descriptive statistics
of the growth rate of each series for the period 1968-2007.
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of Business Cycle Indicators Growth Rates
Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
GDP 0.75 0.82 -2.05 3.82
EMP 0.21 0.71 -3.59 2.38
IPI 0.15 0.21 -0.77 1.23
MANU 0.24 0.99 -3.21 3.54
RPI 0.24 0.54 -3.21 4.00
Notes: This table presents summary statistics for the five economic indicators defined in Table 9 for
the period 1968 to 2007. Mean states for the sample average, Std. Dev. for the standard deviation,
Min. for the minimum sample value, Max. for the maximum sample value. Economic indicators de-
tailed in Table 9. Source: Federal Reserve Economic Data.
5 A Narrative Measure of Tax Anticipations using Me-
dia Data
Next, I turn to present a novel narrative approach to measure the level of anticipation of
fiscal changes using media data. Our goal is to find a measure that captures meaning-
ful contributions to beliefs about a potential tax bill approval in a future period through
the information released in the news. The beliefs may be those of a representative
economic agent that watched TV news and saw different tax episode approvals. Peo-
ple may also gather information from sources other to the mass media. An advantage
of exploiting the information provided through the TV channel is that it exposes a large
share of the population to the same information shocks simultaneously.
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There are different dimensions of a tax episode that could be relevant to the an-
ticipated economic response of agents. In this work, I measure on the anticipation of
a tax bill approval at Congress because of its first order importance to the study of
economic responses to anticipations. However, other dimensions could be explored
such as the sign, magnitude, the progressive nature and the different characteristics
of the tax base. Tax episodes with different signs may lead to different kinds of an-
ticipation effects, that is, an anticipation of increases in VAT may induce individuals to
increase consumption but one of a tax cut may induce individuals to reduce it. I also
study the effects of anticipation of episodes of different sign but learning aside other
characteristics is left to future work.
The objects of interest are the beliefs about a tax change happening today and
some periods ahead conditional on the information today. Let me denote these objects
p
t+j |t for j = 0, .., J , where J is the maximum predictable horizon. I define the relevant
information set to predict j-months ahead tax changes as the collection of pieces of tax
news released at a particular month t. To estimate the measure of beliefs I exploit the
variation of the frequency of relevant text features in the tax news across months. It is
key to restrict the focus to exogenous tax changes since otherwise fiscal changes may
be related to other unobservable variables affecting economic activity, contaminating
any empirical results relating tax changes and economic activity.
5.1 Data Processing
To construct measures of beliefs, I created a balanced time series variable of aggre-
gate monthly tax news to which I apply automatic text analysis techniques for pre-
processing. The pre-processing stage consists of removing english stopwords2, delet-
ing punctuation characters, digits and words of less than three characters and trans-
forming to lower case format all words. Finally, I lemmatize and stem3 the data to
reduce the dimension of the vocabulary.
The corpus is the collection of texts of the pre-processed variable, where each text
is the collection of stems used at each month. Using the bag-of-words approach, we
2I also remove all names of the congressmen in charge of the tax bills to avoid the problem of
overfitting through these text features.
3This first step implies singularizing words and lemmatizing verbs. The second part consists of
keeping the stem of each word and removing the rest of information.
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represent a month observation t by a vector of stem frequencies, ft = (f1, f2, ..., fv, ..., fV )t,
where V is the maximum size of the vocabulary of the corpus and fv,t is the absolute
frequency of stem v in month t. Hence, we can represent the corpus as C = {ft}t=1,...,T
where T is the total number of months in the sample. Under this approach, I do not
consider word ordering and the matrix C is a rather sparse matrix of tokens. C is a
matrix of T Months by V features that belong in the corpus.
A final processing step is done into the corpus features to further reduce the di-
mensionality of the problem; I delete those features that appear in less than 10% of
the months in the sample. The purpose of this dimensionality reduction is to eliminate
month-specific words that can overfit the data. The size of the resulting dataset is 177
text features with a sparsity of 82%. The time series dimension of the data is of 477
observations.
Figure 2 describes the processed series of tax news by means of a wordcloud that
represents the relative frequency of all resulting terms in the series. As shown, these
news mostly speak about the different stages of the bill process until being signed.
Table 10 presents summary statistics for frequency of the top 20 text features in the
corpus. The most frequent text feature in the universe of tax news is ’report’. It occurs
on average 8.39 times per month with a standard deviation of 18 and is not present
in only 263 months. Its maximum monthly frequency is 142 times in a month. It is
also very frequent to hear talking about ’tax’, it is present in 295 months4. The stem
for president and other text features representing House or Senate are very frequent.
It is also very common to see ’bill’ or ’note’, ’examin’, ’detail’,’comment’, or ’introduc’,
suggesting that the most common text features in the tax news sample refer to the
process of introducing a new tax bill in the US.
4The difference between the number of months with tax news and the number of months with a
mention of the tax stem is due to the fact that some tax words such as ’taxpayers’ or ’surtax’ have stems
’taxpay’ and ’surtax’, respectively, instead of ’tax’.
This is an instance in which there are more regressors than data points, so that
standard econometric models of discrete choice, such as Multinomial Logit or Probit,
cannot deal with this problem. To address this quantification challenge I use a machine
learning algorithm from the family of Classification and Regression Trees (CART). In
particular, I borrow the Random Forest Classifier to predict a tax episode being ap-
proved in the future conditional on the information on television tax bill news.
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Figure 2: Tax News Universe
Notes: This figure is a wordcloud that represents the relative frequency of text features in the cleaned
sample of tax news. Larger font size implies more frequency in a ratio 4:0.5. Tax news are defined as
those news that mentioned a congressmen in charge of any Romer & Romer (2010) exogenous tax
bill and the stem ’tax’.
5.2 Random Forest Classifier
The Random Forest (RF) was introduced by Breiman (2001). It is an algorithm that
applies bootstrap aggregation to multiple decision trees. A decision tree (in a classi-
fication tasks) is a representation for a classifying possibility where there are nodes
representing the features we want to use for prediction and branches that can combine
the nodes and lead to leafs where there are the classes. This method partitions the
feature space and fits a model to each partition. The algorithm has to learn the criteria
to split the nodes and pruning the trees; in this way it learns how variables fit the data
and which variables are more relevant to fit the data. Two differences distinguish RF
from classical decision trees. The first is that within each decision tree of the forest
the variables considered to split a node are a random subspace of all the features in
the sample. A second important difference is that a RF draws a number of random
samples from the training set and estimates a decision tree for each random sample,
averaging the results over all the estimated trees. This strategy helps reducing the
variance of the estimation and works better in cases where each decision tree has lim-
ited bias. Comprehensive discussions on RF are presented in Hastie et al. (2009) and
Murphy (2012).
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To construct a measure of beliefs on future tax approvals of different signs I estimate
a RF where the dependent variable is an indicator variable that has value 1 if at a
particular month in the future there was a tax approval at Congress. The independent
variables are those in the matrix of text features, C. I implement the estimation with the
R package ’randomForest’ by Liaw & Wiener (2002).
In contrast with a traditional prediction model, such as logit or probit, RF solves the
problem of having too many variables. To exploit the text in a traditional model one
would have to drastically reduce the dimensionality of the text to a few features accord-
ing to some arbitrary criteria whereas using RF there is statistical learning on which
features better predict among a large list of features, what also improves model fit. It is
also attractive in the situation of many predictors because it performs variable selection
in a flexible way. RF is one approach among several approaches that have been re-
cently developed to deal with large covariance spaces. For example, Lasso techniques
and other penalized flexible regression methods are a popular alternative in econo-
metric application (Belloni et al., 2013). However, Caruana et al. (2008) show that RF
classifiers perform better than other models such as SVM, neural nets or boosted trees.
RF were developed in computer science as black-box predictive algorithms. Their
properties from a statistical point of view are an active area of research. A recent con-
tribution is the work of Wager & Athey (2018). This paper develops normal asymptotic
theory to a random forest model and confidence intervals for random forest predictions.
They apply the theory to causal inference of treatment effects with unconfoundedness.
As the authors point out, it is the first step in the direction of making random forests
tools for statistical inference instead of black-box algorithms. Providing standard errors
for the predictions of beliefs produced by RF is out of the scope of this paper.
Text features in the tax news dataset tend to co-occur many times within the series,
i.e. the number of months that two different terms are published together is large. For
example, words like ”new” and ”tax” are mentioned together in 291 months, ”approval”
and ”house” in 113 months. This is common across many pairs of words. In addition,
some words are likely to be redundant for the prediction of a tax approval and even
obscure the prediction power of others if the correlation among them is not properly
accounted for. There are two interesting departures from the classical RF algorithm
that I explore in this section and enhance model performance to the specific data issues
that appear in this paper.
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Fuzzy Random Forests I explore the Fuzzy Random Forests (FF) introduced by
Conn et al. (2016) in the R implementation ’fuzzyforest’. This approach consists of es-
timating different classical RF to predict the target variable using different groups of co-
variates. The groups of covariates can be proposed by the researcher as the outcome
of some correlation analysis, such as the proposed Weighted Gene-Coexpression Net-
work Analysis (WGCNA). From each group-level RF the least important variables are
discarded by setting a drop parameter. There is a selection RF run using all the
screened covariates resulting from the group-level RF. From this last RF the researcher
can set another final number of selected covariates to which a final RF is fit. Depending
on the number of iterations made into each group-level and the selection RF the com-
putation burden of the algorithm can be large. In the following I show that this algorithm
is more suitable for the prediction of tax approvals since it is the case that there are
many redundant words in the vocabulary.
5.3 Estimated Beliefs
In this section, I describe the empirical measures of tax anticipations that exploit TV
data and Random Forests. In Figures 8 and 9, I present the OOB (out-of-bag) pre-
dictions from RF and FF which, in this case, are predicted probabilities of tax episode
approvals at t + 1 conditional on the information set at t (computed using the boot-
strap samples that the algorithms did not use to estimate the model, so these are
out-of-sample predictions of the models). We can note that there are 5 episodes which
are predicted by the FF, from the most predicted to the less predicted, we find, the
Economic Recovery Act of 1981, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, the Tax Reform Act of 1969 and the Rev-
enue Act of 1971. The RF has lower predictability than the FF because it predicts less
episodes. For the rest of the paper we focus in FF results as estimated measures of
tax anticipations.
The FF fitted probability of tax approvals at t+1 conditional on information released
at t is presented in Figure 10. Summary Statistics for this measure are presented in
Table 5. As we can see, for one-month-ahead anticipation of tax approvals the median
belief in the time series is a 0,4%, however, the 95% is 9,7% and the standard deviation
is 12.7%. The two-month-ahead and three-month-ahead measures of anticipation have
a smaller 95th percentiles and slightly smaller standard deviations. In Figure 11, I
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Table 5: FF Summary Statistics
P (approvalt+1|Newst) P (approvalt+2|Newst) P (approvalt+3|Newst)
p25 0 0 0
p50 0.004 0.005 0.005
p75 0.021 0.022 0.021
p95 0.097 0.061 0.070
SD 0.125 0.107 0.114
Notes: This table contains the 25th-percentile (p25), the median (p50), the 75th-percentile (p75),
95th-percentile (p95) of the estimated measures of beliefs for tax approvals at t + 1, t + 2 and t + 3
respectively en each column. SD states for standard deviation.
show which are the text features that have more predictability for one-month-ahead tax
anticipations. ’tax’, ’presid’, ’consid’, ’bill’ and vocabulary related to the the approval
of tax bills at the US Congress are in this top ranking. In Appendix C I expose other
results from Fuzzy Forest which might be of interest to the reader.
On the shadow side, the estimated models present relatively poor predictive per-
formance. Using out-of-bag (OOB) samples none of these models predicted the event
of a tax change next month with more than 50% probability, however FF was closer at
some events. One explanation for this result relates to the limited number of exogenous
tax episodes to learn from in the sample period, 20 versus the 457 months. Whereas
it may seem that a TV viewer watching a news report about tax legislation would likely
be able to predict very well a tax approval in the next month, this does not need to be
the case because viewers receive different levels of information across episodes.
In Table 11, I provide a comparison of the two models across different measures
of goodness of fit. Accuracy and Lift AUC is slightly larger for Classical RF but Gain
AUC is larger for FF, however, all the accuracy measures are pretty similar across the
two models. However, Log-Loss, MSE, RMSE, PRAUC, RMSE, PRAUC and Zero One
Loss are smaller for FF. The two models are pretty similar, slightly higher accuracy for
RF while lower loss for FF, what allows us to conclude that FF predictions are better
than those of Classical RF.
The anticipatory information contained in the measure of anticipations is a combi-
nation of salience of the tax news and the likelihood of approval of the tax bill given
the political context. Disentangling between these two channels is challenging given
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the interconnection between the political decisions and the media. I also estimate mea-
sures of tax anticipations for two and three months ahead of potential episode approval.
It is also important to note that the current implementations in R were released very
recently, so further testing is warranted.
6 A Model for the Effects of Taxes and Anticipations
on Economic Activity
In this section, I develop a time series approach to measure the effects of tax changes
and their short-term anticipations on economic activity. I start by introducing the gen-
eral framework and incorporate the different shocks to a dynamic model of economic
activity.
6.1 A Model for Monthly Economic Activity
Traditionally, the measure of economic activity used to account for the effects of tax
changes has been quarterly GDP. One concern with the use of quarterly GDP is that
time aggregation may mask important anticipation effects; after all information dissem-
inated through the media may evolve quickly in a matter of days or weeks. Here, I
target a monthly frequency which is economically relevant for the question at hand and
empirically feasible, given the indicators of economic activity at my disposal.
Stock & Watson (1991) provided a methodology to construct an index of economic
activity exploiting the co-movements of monthly indicators. Later, Mariano & Murasawa
(2003) provided a mixed frequency dynamic factor model that allows to exploit quar-
terly GDP jointly with indicators that have other time frequencies. I borrow their mixed
frequency dynamic factor model (MFDFM) which allows me to incorporate data at dif-
ferent frequencies by modeling missing observations corresponding to lower frequency
indicators, quarterly GDP in particular. For the purpose of this paper, mixing frequen-
cies has two different advantages. Not only it profits from the quarterly GDP variation
to construct the coincident indicator of economic activity but it also recovers an index
of economic activity that relates to latent monthly GDP. For all t, a one factor model for
y∗t = (y
∗
1t, y2t) is such that:
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φf (L)ft = ωt (2)
















where β ∈ RN is a factor loading vector, ft is a scalar stationary sequence of a common
factor, et is an N-variate stationary sequence of idiosyncratic shocks or factors, L is a
lag operator, φf (.) is a pth-order polynomial on R, φe(.) is a qth-order polynomial on
RNxN . The left-hand side variable in the first equation, y∗1,t, is monthly GDP which is a
latent variable in our model. The second outcome, y2,t, is a N − 1 vector of observable
indicators of economic activity at monthly frequency. σ2ω is the variance of the error term
in the model for the common factor. Σ is the variance covariance matrix of the error
term in the VAR model for the idiosyncratic shocks. For identification of this model we
normalize the first element of β (the one associated with the first economic indicator
of the measurement equation) to β1 = 1, and we specify Σ and φe(.) as diagonal
matrices. Since y∗1,t is latent, one cannot estimate model (1)-(4), instead, the proposal
of Mariano & Murasawa (2003) is to estimate a model with yt = (y1t, y2t), where y1t
is quarterly GDP observable every third period and change the specification for the
measurement equation of y1t to one that expresses quarterly GDP as the geometric


























This expression for y1,t comes from defining latent quarterly GDP as the geomet-
ric mean of monthly levels, taking logarithms to GDP and expressing quarterly GDP
growth in terms of the factor. The result is that our one factor model implicitly con-
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where the left-hand side will contain only observables and β2 and e2 will be vectors of
the same dimension as y2,t.
6.2 Tax Shocks on Monthly Economic Activity
In this section, I propose a methodology for measuring the effects of tax changes on
economic activity at monthly frequency. Romer & Romer (2010) provided evidence
on the effects of exogenous tax changes on quarterly GDP using a dynamic linear
regression model of quarterly GDP on tax liability changes. Not only the magnitude
of the effects and its persistence are relevant features of a policy, but also the time at
which the effects come into place. From a policy perspective, one may need to choose
between two types of policies so having a methodology that measures the effects at
higher frequency than a quarter seems an interesting avenue of work. To estimate the
effects of tax liability changes on monthly economic activity I suggest estimating a DFM




θsτt−s + ω˜t (5)
where τt−s is a tax liability shock to the economy at time t−s, θs accounts for the effects
of a tax liability shock happening at time s before, S is the maximum number of lags
to allow for the effects of tax liability changes on GPD. ω˜t is the new error term for the
factor. For causal validity it is key to satisfy the identification assumption that ω˜t and
τt−s are independent for all t, s, and this is the reason why the narrative approach uses
RR exogenous tax liability changes instead of all types of tax liability changes during
this period.
6.3 Media Anticipation on Monthly Economic Activity
There is considerable amount of information prior to the approval of a tax bill that spills
through the mass media and has prediction power on tax bill approvals, as documented
in Section 5. Does mass media anticipation have any effects on economic activity prior
to the approvals? To answer this question, I measure the effects of the media-based
anticipation measure of tax approvals at t+ i conditional on the information released at
t by specifying the following model for my latent factor of economic activity:







δipt+i|t + ω¯t (6)
where p
t+i|t is the media-based anticipation measure for a tax approval happening at
t+ i conditional on the information at t. δi is the effect of unit changes in the beliefs for
rises and cuts approvals respectively. This model traces the effects of taxes from initial
information releases by the media to the public. It will capture if there is any effect of
tax anticipations under uncertainty of the bill being legally approved. Obviously we do
not observe the true value of the beliefs, these beliefs are estimated in a previous step







δipˆt+i|t + ωˆt (7)
where pˆ
t+i|t is a proxy for the true beliefs on tax legislation approval and ωˆt is the new
error term. Hence it is crucial that the error term is unrelated not only to implemented
tax changes but also mass media beliefs on future tax approvals.
Anticipation of tax approvals associated to tax liability increases are likely to have
different effects of those implying tax liability cuts. The joint prediction of sign and
approval of a tax episode is challenging given the available data. However, it is not far
from reality that people know the sign before the approval of a particular episode. To
provide light on the differential effects of anticipations of tax rises with respect to tax
cuts I construct an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 when there is a mention







δ−i pˆt+i|t + βst +
I∑
i=0
δ+i pˆt+i|tst + ω˙t (8)
where δ+i and δ
−
i are the effects of anticipated tax approvals conditional on the mention
of tax increases in the news or the absence of mention, respectively. β captures the
marginal effect of mentioning tax rises in economic activity. ω˙t is the new error term.
6.3.1 Controlling for Implementation Delays
In the time between a tax approval and its implementation there is knowledge that a
tax liability change is going to take place at a given point in time and this knowledge
may affect economic activity. Mertens & Ravn (2012) document that there are sig-
nificant anticipation effects of tax changes during the months between approval and
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implementation of the tax liability changes. Their notion of anticipation refers to the
information that makes the economic agent certain of a tax implementation at a given
point in time in the future. In contrast, this paper studies anticipations where the agent
still has uncertainty about the event of a tax approval at Congress. To avoid confusion
here I refer to Mertens & Ravn (2012) classification of tax liability changes according to
information as on-time, when they refer to changes that are implemented at the same
time they are approved at Congress, and delayed, when there is one or more periods
between the time of approval of the tax change and its implementation.
The omission of this intermediate period of information may contaminate the esti-
mates of the implementation effects of tax changes because previous levels of eco-
nomic activity may be affected by the knowledge of a future tax change implementa-
tion. In addition, this fact potentially may contaminate the effects of media anticipation
of taxes if there is some correlation in the data between delayed tax changes and the
measure of mass media beliefs on a future tax approval. To control for these potential
intermediate period effects I follow Mertens & Ravn (2012) strategy to account for the
potential effects of delayed tax changes versus on-time tax changes. In contrast to their
work, I use measures of implementation delays computed at monthly frequency. The
specification for the factor (2) that controls for all uncertain and certain anticipations on



















δipˆt+i|t + ω˙t (9)
where τ ot−s are on-time tax shocks which are implemented at t − s, τ dt−j are delayed
tax shocks which are implemented at t − j, τ dt,m are cumulative delayed tax shocks at
t to be implemented at t +m. On-time tax shocks are only part of the information set
when implemented, that is at t − s. Delayed tax shocks are part of the information
set when the laws are approved but they are implemented m periods ahead, thus
we track the effects of implementation and the effects of the tax being part of the
information set since the law approval using this distinction. Finally ω˙t is the new error
term. This specification controls for the effects of tax changes since the first spills of
information captured by the mass media beliefs until their implementation and posterior
dynamics. The identification of these effects is achieved if the error term is uncorrelated
to implementation, delayed and anticipation tax shocks. A final specification is the one
combining the effects of st as in (8) to model (9).
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While Romer & Romer (2010) estimate a dynamic regression model for GDP, Mertens
& Ravn (2012) estimate a VAR model on quarterly economic activity indicators. Mean-
while, I estimate effects on a latent measure of monthly economic activity that is iden-
tified through the MFDFM.
7 Empirical Results
In this section I provide evidence on the effects of exogenous tax changes and their
anticipations on economic activity. The estimates are the result from the estimation
of the MFDFM detailed at Section 6.1 for various specifications of the factor process
(2). To do so I use the Kalman Filter and Maximum Likelihood Estimation. Economic
activity series are expressed in first differences of the natural log multiplied by 100,
i.e. in growth rates. Table 4 describes the series of economic indicators. Romer
& Romer (2010) exogenous tax liability changes are expressed in percentage points
of monthly GDP. Table 7 describes tax liability changes in the period 1968-2007 as
a whole and disaggregated into unanticipated and anticipated using the definition of
Mertens & Ravn (2012) (on-time and delayed in the terminology of this paper). I de-
mean all the series so that the models are estimated without constant terms. I do not
standardize the growth rates of the indicators neither the tax and information shocks,
so that I can identify the common factor as the latent monthly real GDP growth. Before
estimation, I follow Mariano & Murasawa (2003) and substitute missing observations
of the every-third-period observable y1t with random draws from a standard normal
distribution.
7.1 Implementation Effects of Tax Changes
Figure 3 presents the implementation effects of exogenous tax liability changes on
economic activity, in the period 1948 to 2007, following model (5) for the factor. I control
for up to S = 36 period dynamics, that is, for three year dynamics as in Romer & Romer
(2010). The figure shows the cumulative effects in terms of an increase in tax liabilities
of a one percent of QGDP together with the one-standard-error bands. The maximum
effects are achieved 29 months after implementation of the tax changes when monthly
economic activity growth drops by 99.56%. Given that average monthly GDP growth
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was approximately 0.29% in 1948-2007, the maximum implementation effect of a 1%
of QGDP increase of tax liabilities is a reduction of monthly economic activity growth of
0,28%. There are also immediate effects of the tax changes on monthly GDP growth.
For example, two months after implementation tax increases reduce monthly economic
activity growth by 15.8%. The monthly dynamics and magnitude of the effects are
comparable to the baseline results of Romer & Romer (2010), which are expressed on
a quarterly basis and with respect to the level of GDP.
Figure 3: Tax Changes on Economic Activity
Notes: This figure shows the cumulative effect of a one percent percent increase in tax liabilities over
monthly GDP of the Romer & Romer (2010) exogenous tax changes.
For the period that we dispose of television data, 1968 to 2007, immediate imple-
mentation effects are -6.6% for monthly economic activity growth. Two months after
implementation the effects are -10.7%. Maximum effects are a -69.1% and happen 25
months after implementation.
7.2 Media Anticipation on Economic Activity
This section presents evidence on the effects of mass media anticipations of tax bills
approvals on economic activity. The effects are captured by the parameter δj for
j = 1, 2, 3 of model (7); that is, the effects of a marginal change in the probability of a
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tax approval happening one to three months ahead on current economic activity con-
ditional on all the relevant information of tax news in the media. Baseline results use
the estimated measure of anticipations from the FF algorithm. Mass media induced
beliefs about a tax approval next month significantly affect current economic activity as
documented in Table 6. I quantify that a ten percent probability of a tax approval at the
Table 6: Media Anticipation Effects on Current Economic Activity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
P(Tax Approval at t+1) 0.155 0.1698 0.304 0.303
(0.099) (0.097) (0.125) (0.122)
P(Tax Approval at t+2) -0.039 -0.0008 -0.050 -0.025
(0.115) (0.115) (0.156) (0.155)
P(Tax Approval at t+3) -0.026 -0.0314 -0.091 -0.101
(0.109) (0.108) (0.117) (0.116)
Tax Increase at t 0.003 -0.009
(0.034) (0.035)
P(Tax Approval at t+1)*Tax Increase at t -0.443 -0.407
(0.209) (0.210)
P(Tax Approval at t+2)*Tax Increase at t -0.019 0.025
(0.234) (0.234)
P(Tax Approval at t+3)*Tax Increase at t 0.486 0.523
(0.306) (0.298)
Observations 471 471 471 471
Notes: This table contains the effects of one to three month ahead media anticipation of tax approvals
on current economic activity using the estimated beliefs of a FF. Column (1) presents the results from
the factor model affected by RR exogenous tax implementations plus beliefs on tax bills approvals.
Column (2) presents the results when the factor is differentially affected by on-time and delayed tax li-
ability changes and implementation delays on top of media anticipation. Columns (3) and (4) present
of model () and () but it distinguishes the effects of anticipations of net tax cuts from net tax rises.
following month increases the growth rate by 1.5%. Beliefs on tax approvals happening
two or three periods ahead revert sign and are poorly significant.
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Figure 4 presents the cumulative implementation effects of a one percent increase
in tax liabilities after controlling for mass media anticipation of tax bill approvals up to
three months ahead, together with one-standard-error bands. There are some quanti-
tative differences with respect to the results presented of Section 7.1. The one-month
implementation effects become -6.6% of monthly EA, two months after implementa-
tion tax changes reduce monthly EA by 10.35% and the maximum implementation
effect is -65.32% of montly EA, smaller in absolute value to the maximum effect of tax
changes if one does not consider media anticipations. However, maximum effects are
also reached 25 months after implementation. After considering the measures of tax
anticipations, the direct implementation effects of tax changes are reduced in absolute
value suggesting an upward bias in previous estimates.
Figure 4: Tax Changes on Economic Activity controlling for Media Anticipations
Notes: This figure shows the cumulative effect of a one percent percent increase in tax liabilities after
controlling for the new measure of media anticipations of the Romer & Romer (2010) exogenous tax
episodes.
As documented by Mertens & Ravn (2012), in some tax episodes, there is a lapse
of time between the approval and the implementation of tax changes, which I define
as implementation delay. To the purpose of this paper, I use the term anticipations
only for predictions of taxes under uncertainty while these authors refer to anticipations
once it is certain the future implementation date. I estimate the model for M = 18, as in
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Mertens & Ravn (2012). In column (2) of Table 6 I also present the results of estimating
MFDFM with specification (9) for the factor. I distinguish between delayed and on-time
tax liability changes and include tax implementation delays. The absolute value of the
effects of media anticipation slightly increase in this specification, so not controlling for
the Mertens & Ravn (2012) does not confound the effects of media anticipations. In
Figures 12 and 13, I show that implementation effects of on-time tax changes are not
significantly different from zero and the they are reduced in absolute value. The ef-
fects of delayed tax changes are significant are larger than the original implementation
effects of tax changes of Figure 4. Up to seven month implementation delays of tax
rises have a positive and significant impact on economic activity of 40% of monthly EA.
Longer horizon implementation delays are poorly estimated as shown in the Figure.
7.3 Heterogeneous Effects of Tax Anticipations
In this section, I provide evidence of the differential effects for anticipation of tax cuts
and tax rises. Conditional on the media release of information about a potential tax ap-
proval, it is likely that people is aware of what is the net tax liability change associated
to the potential approval since media also makes reference to terms like ”increase”,
”rise” or ”cut”. There are 20 episode approvals in the sample and learning how to pre-
dict the sign joint to the approval based on 10 approvals per sign resulted in something
unfeasible. I construct an indicator variable that captures the mention of ”increase” or
”rise” within the tax news to approximate the possibility of a tax rise approval. The
average of this variable is 0.23 and the standard deviation is 0.42, it takes the value 1
in 10% of the months approximately.
In columns (3) and (4) I control for this indicator and its interaction with media an-
ticipation of tax approvals for the classical Romer & Romer (2010) and the Mertens &
Ravn (2012), respectively. A 10% probability of tax approvals conditional on the tax
news at t not mentioning tax increases significantly stimulates current monthly eco-
nomic activity growth by 3.04%. In the case of the media mentioning tax increases the
effect is a reduction of monthly economic activity growth by 1.36%. In column (4) the
effects are 3.03% and 1.12% respectively what implies that controlling for implementa-
tion delays slightly reduces the magnitude of the effects of anticipation of tax increases,
however the effects are still statistically significantly different from zero. The implemen-
tation effects of tax changes for the results of column (3) are -6.14%, -10.19% and
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 36 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1828
-67.11% for one-month, two-month and maximum effects respectively, hence they are
similar to those corresponding to the results of column (1).
8 Conclusions
This paper introduces a new empirical measure that captures the level of anticipation of
tax bill approvals in the US for the period 1968-2007. I combine text data and machine
learning techniques to construct a measure that enables the study of anticipation ef-
fects of tax changes on economic activity following the steps of the narrative approach.
Since time aggregation in the analysis of economic indicators may mask important
anticipation effects and information may evolve quickly in a matter of days, the paper
proposes a mixed frequency dynamic factor model to estimate both the economic ac-
tivity latent factor and the effects of anticipated tax shocks on it. To my knowledge this
is the first paper that exploits a dynamic factor model to account for fiscal policy effects
on economic activity.
This work constributes to the study of the macroeconomic effects of available in-
formation of different policies prior to their legal approval by providing a strategy that
exploits information in the news and combines it with other lower frequency economic
indicators using a well-estabilished methodology.
My results reveal that one-month-ahead anticipations of tax approvals significantly
stimulate current economic activity. A ten percent increment in the measure of onemonth
ahead anticipations reduces the monthly growth rate by 1.5%. Two and three month
ahead anticipations revert sign but do not have a statistically significant effect on eco-
nomic activity. After controlling for mass media anticipation, direct implementation ef-
fects of tax changes are reduced in absolute value but still have short-run negative
significant effects. I also analyze the effects of the anticipation of tax increases versus
tax cuts finding that it is the anticipation of tax cuts what stimulates the economy.
Media coverage of tax episodes at particular dates may be related to unobserv-
able factors that relate to economic activity. I overcome this concern by aggregating
the news in a month and assuming that tax announcements can be postponed but
not replaced within the month. Finally, there may have been anticipation of eventually
not-approved tax bills. In principle, my measure of beliefs can capture them as long as
congressmen in charge of those where also in charge of some approved bill. Capturing
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the effects for this sort of episodes may be worth as a piece of evidence of unconven-
tional fiscal policy but I do not dispose of data that allows me to identify those specific
episodes.
The measure of tax anticipations captures both information about tax salience and
that of the likelihood of approval of a tax bill at Congress. The strong relation between
both channels of information challenges the study of their separate effects, postponing
this question to future work. Finally, Random Forests, as other machine learning al-
gorithms, were developed in computer science as black-box predictive algorithms and
their properties from a statistical point of view are currently an active area of research.
Providing standard errors on the output of Random Forests is something I hope could
be addressed in future research.
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Figure 6: Tax Episodes
Notes: This figure shows the time series of Romer & Romer (2010) exogenous tax episodes as a
share of quarterly GDP (percentage points) at approval months. The time series starts at January
1945 and ends at December 2008.
Appendix A Additional Figures
Figure 5: Exogenous Tax Liability Changes
Notes: This figure shows the time series of Romer & Romer (2010) exogenous tax liability changes
as a share of quarterly GDP (percentage points) at implementation months. The time series starts at
January 1945 and ends at December 2008.
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Figure 7: Tax News VTDA Salience
Notes: This figure shows the time series of television salience of tax news expressed in seconds us-
ing the VTDA sample of news. The time series starts at August 1968 and ends at December 2008.
Figure 8: RF OOB Predicted Probability of a Tax Approval at t+ 1
Notes: This figure shows the OOB predicted probability of media anticipations for tax bill approvals at
Congress at t+ 1 conditional on VDTA Tax News at t for the period July 1968 to December 2007 and
using standard Random Forests.
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Notes: This figure shows the OOB predicted probability of media anticipations for tax bill approvals at
Congress at t + 1 conditional on VDTA Tax TV News at t for the period July 1968 to December 2007
using Fuzzy Forests.
Figure 10: FF Predicted Probability of a Tax Approval at t+ 1
Notes: This figure shows the fitted predicted probability measure of media anticipations for tax bill
approvals at Congress at t + 1 conditional on VDTA Tax TV News at t for the period July 1968 to De-
cember 2007 using Fuzzy Forests.
Figure 9: FF OOB Predicted Probability of a Tax Approval at t+ 1
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Notes: This figure describes the ranking of feature importance for classification of one-period-ahead
months as months of tax approvals in US Congress conditional on VDTA Tax TV News at current
month. The right-hand-side figure uses Mean Decrease Gini while the left-hand-side figure uses Mean
Decrease Accuracy to measure feature importance for prediction. From the top to the bottom, more to
less relevant features.
Figure 11: Feature Importance in the one-month-ahead Fuzzy Forest
Notes: This figure shows the cumulative effect of a one percent percent increase in on-time tax liabil-
ities of Romer & Romer (2010) exogenous tax changes, distinguishing between on-time and delayed
tax changes as in Mertens & Ravn (2012) and also controlling for media tax anticipations.
Figure 12: On-time Tax Changes on Economic Activity
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Notes: This figure shows the cumulative effect of a one percent percent increase in delayed tax liabil-
ities of Romer & Romer (2010) exogenous tax changes, distinguishing between on-time and delayed
tax changes as in Mertens & Ravn (2012) and also controlling for implementation delays (as in Mertens
& Ravn (2012)) and media tax anticipations.
Notes: Tax change is the estimated magnitude of the exogenous tax liability changes measured in dollars
by Romer & Romer (2010) divided by the QGDP and expressed in percentage points. Horizon is the num-
ber of months between implementation of the tax change and approval of the tax episode. The summary
statistics correspond to time series 1945 to 2007.
Figure 13: Delayed Tax Changes on Economic Activity
Appendix B Additional Tables
Table 7: Romer & Romer (2010) Exogenous Tax Liability Changes
Variable Delayed Mean SD MIN 25th-p Median 75th-p MAX Obs
Tax change No -0.23 0.56 -1.83 -0.34 -0.19 0.12 0.49 21
Horizon No 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21
Tax change Yes -0.04 0.52 -1.65 -0.15 0.09 0.31 0.76 39
Horizon Yes 20.72 19.33 1.00 5.00 16.00 29.00 80.00 39
Tax change All -0.11 0.54 -1.83 -0.26 0.05 0.24 0.76 60
Horizon All 13.47 18.44 0.00 0.00 5.00 20.50 80.00 60
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Notes: This table contains the relative frequency for tax approvals (1) and tax implementations (2) in
particular months of the year across the sample period 1945-2007.
Notes: Definition of economic activity indicators used in this paper. Source: FRED, Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis.
Table 8: Monthly Tax Activity














Table 9: US Business Cycle Indicators
Indicator Description
GDP
GDP quarterly, seasonally adjusted annual rate, deflated with
Implicit Price Deflator of GDP (Index 2009=100, quarterly, seasonally adjusted)
EMP
All employees: total nonfarm payrolls, thousands of persons,
monthly, seasonally adjusted
IPI
Industrial Production Index, Index 2012=100, monthly,
seasonally adjusted
MANU
Real Manufacturing and Trade Industries Sales, millions of
chained 2009 Dollars, monthly, seasonally Adjusted
RPI
Real personal income excluding current transfer receipts, billions
of chained 2009 Dollars, monthly, seasonally adjusted annual rate
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Table 10: Top 20 Text Features
Mean Std. Dev. Median Max Not null
report 8.39 18 1 142 263
tax 6.61 12.79 2 98 295
presid 4.45 10.29 1 92 240
say 4.18 8.06 1 61 257
senat 2.71 6.53 0 62 190
repres 2.65 7.87 0 78 189
note 2.32 5.94 0 52 187
hous 2.23 6.26 0 70 180
comment 1.86 6.66 0 76 153
introduc 1.79 5.34 0 62 191
congr 1.75 4.14 0 38 161
plan 1.75 4.72 0 46 145
cut 1.68 5.5 0 62 137
budget 1.68 9.01 0 164 109
bill 1.58 5.41 0 67 121
show 1.55 4.6 0 55 182
democrat 1.48 4.62 0 51 129
give 1.43 3.09 0 29 193
state 1.38 3.76 0 54 175
examin 1.24 3.56 0 46 157
Notes: This table describes the absolute monthly frequency of the twenty most frequent text features
int the corpus of tax news for the period 1968 to 2008. There are 489 (month) observations in the
sample period. Tax news are defined as those news that mentioned a congressmen in charge of any
Romer & Romer (2010) exogenous tax bill and the stem ’tax’. Mean states for the sample average,
Std. Dev. for the standard deviation, Median for the median, Sum for the total sample occurrence,
Range for the difference between the minimum and maximum value in the sample, Not null for the total
months of no occurrence, Obs. for the month observations
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Table 11: Goodness of Fit Measures
Classical RF Fuzzy Forests
Accuracy 0.958 0.957
AUC 2.067 2.067
Gain AUC 0.507 0.508







Zero One Loss 0.852 0.686
Notes: This table contains a list of measures of goodness of fit for Random Forests Classifiers com-
paring the results for OOB Classical RF, Test WSRF, OOB FF results. Accuracy is the share of true
positive and true negative predictions made over the total of test samples. AUC is the area under the
ROC curve, AUC is the area under the curve and measures the probability that a classifier will rank a
randomly chosen positive instance higher than a randomly chosen negative one, Gain AUC, Lift AUC
measures how much more likely a positive responses is received than a randomly chosen response,
KS is score/probability band where separate between positives and negatives is maximum. Log-loss
is the negative log-likelihood of the true labels given a probabilistic classifiers predictions. MSE is the
mean square error of predicted probability of classes versus true classes. PRAUC is the area under
the precision-recall curve, RMSE is the root mean squared error of the predicted probability of classes
versus true classes, RMSLE is the root mean squared logarithmic loss. Zero One Loss is the normal-
ized classification error loss.
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Appendix C Fuzzy Forests Results
In this section I explain the details of the estimation of Fuzzy Forests (FF) to predict a
tax approval at the US Congress using media data.
In a first stage, this algorithm suggests the estimation of Weighted Gene-Coexpression
Network Analysis to the original set of covariates to identify groups of correlated fea-
tures. This first stage can be rephrased as estimating an average hierarchical cluster-
ing model using as input data a matrix of topological overlap dissimilarities, which is a
way of representing the networks of the original data set. Setting a threshold level, the
algorithm finds a number of modules (or groups) of variables that would relate more
closely. I decide to do WGCNA on the text features alone, since I do not want the
algorithm to disregard variables such as past salience or episodes. I chose power of 3
and minimum module size of 20 to avoid having too many groups. The resulting mod-
ules are described in Figures 14 to 17 using word clouds that represent the relative
frequency of features in the corpus for each modules.
The turquoise module contains words mostly related to ’report’, ’hous’, ’presid’, ’sen-
ate’, which are instituional features of the process of the bill approval at US Congress.
The brown module represents words related mostly to ’introduc’, ’comment’, ’cam-
paign’, ’mention’, that is, words that deal with different comments at the initial debate
of a bill. The blue module is a group of words related to other issues that interact to
tax changes in the process of debate. Finally, the grey module is a small group about
some government departments and past vocabulary.
For each module, a Recursive Feature Elimination Random Forests (RFE-RF) is
estimated to screened out the least predictive features. The researcher has to decide
how many features are eliminated at each iteration and how many features wants to
keep. I set to elimitate 1% of the features at each iteration until having dropped 75%
of the original number of features in the module. After the screening step, the algo-
rithm runs a final RFE-RF using all the screened features from the different modules
to predict the dependent variable. In this stage, the interaction between the different
features is taken care of. Here, I also eliminate a 1% of screened features until I keep
the best 50 features according to the algorithm. Figure 18 presents the relative im-
portance before and after the screening of features. The most present module is the
turquoise followed by the blue and the brown. The red part of the bars is the amount
of words finally selected from each module after feature selection. The grey module
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almost dissapears after feature selection. This selection of features is consistent with
the predictability of the features since the turquoise group is more relate to the event
of approval of a bill while the brown module relates to the initial process of bill approval
where there is considerable uncertainty about the potential approval. Finally, I estimate
a classical RF using the 50 selected features.
Figure 14: Blue Word Cloud
Figure 15: Brown Word Cloud
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Figure 16: Grey Word Cloud
Figure 17: Turquoise Word Cloud
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Figure 18: Modules Distribution
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